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SUBJECT: CANADIAN SENATE RELEASES REPORT OUTLINING DEFENCE AND SECURITY PROBLEMS

1. (U) Summary: The Canadian Senate's Standing Committee on National Security and Defence released a report, "The Canadian Security Guidebook: An Update of Security Problems in Search of Solutions" on December 8. In the report, the committee cites eighty-six problems in the following areas: Border Crossings, Coasts, Canadian Forces, Structure and Coordination of Government, Ports, Airports, and Emergency Preparedness. Among the primary recommendations of the Senate Committee are: the Canadian Defence Budget requires an increase of \$3.2 Billion USD per year, a judicial inquiry is required to examine the presence of organized crime in Canada's ports, mail and cargo should be scanned at airports, and all airport staff should be given complete background checks. End summary.

2. (U) The Canadian Senate's Standing Committee on National Security and Defence released a report, "The Canadian Security Guidebook: An Update of Security Problems in Search of Solutions" on December 8. The report is the result of a three-year study of border security and defence issues that began in January 2001. It is widely accepted that Senate Committee reports maintain a higher standard than those of the House of Commons for the following reasons: 1) Senators are considered very capable and experienced, 2) investigations are non-partisan, 3) Senate investigations are not over-exposed in the media, 4) Senators are free to invest time in research and analysis, and 5) Senators can work on a topic for years without election or reassignment.

3. (U) The Senators identified the following problems and made recommendations to address the issues.

#### A. Border Crossings

-- Poor Threat Identification at the Border. The committee recommends that the government invest in training and give access to police databanks to border personnel.

-- Long CSIS Processing Times. The committee recommends that CSIS be given more resources for screening refugee claimants.

-- Undertrained Part-Time Customs Staff. The committee recommends that all staff be trained to same standard, including part-time and summer students.

-- Unsafe Border Posts. The committee recommends that government not allow border posts to be manned by single officers.

-- Arm Customs Officials. The committee recommends that more evidence be collected for better debate on whether or not to arm border guards.

#### B. Coasts

-- Canada's Vulnerable Coasts. The committee recommends that the government turn its stated goals on maritime security into action.

-- Coastal Radar - Off the Government's radar? The committee recommends that the Canadian Forces be given the resources to expand its High Frequency Surface Radar Project.

-- Inadequate Short-Range Coastal Patrols. The committee recommends that UAVs be deployed to regularly patrol the coastline.

-- Inadequate Long-Range Coastal Patrols. The committee recommends that government study the possibility of deploying UAVs to long range, extended time surveillance, including the Arctic.

-- Canada's Toothless Coast Guard. The committee recommends that the mandate of the coast guard be expanded and that it becomes an independent agency, not a branch of Fisheries and Oceans.

-- No Notification Prior to Arrival. The committee

recommends that all ships should notify port authorities 48 hours prior to arrival.

-- Taking Incoming Vessels at Their Word. The committee recommends that ships be compelled to report their port of departure and estimated time of arrival in Canada.

-- Need Network for Maritime Warnings. The committee recommends that Canada trade information on commercial shipping traffic with other, like-minded states.

-- Unannounced Vessels. The committee recommends that ships entering Canadian waters must have transponders to allow comparisons of declared and actual routes.

-- Transponders for Smaller Vessels. The committee recommends that all ships over 15 tonnes should be equipped with transponders.

-- Dangerous Containers. The committee recommends that CSIS officers be deployed to foreign ports to gather information on container shipping.

-- Lack of Border Officials Abroad. The committee recommends that Canadian Border Officials be moved from Newark and Tacoma, U.S.A. to world ports that are more likely to be the origin of a terrorist attack.

-- Great Lakes Surveillance. The committee recommends that the same standards set for high-seas shipping be applied to Great Lakes traffic.

-- Surveillance of Coasts, Lakes and Rivers. The committee recommends that the RCMP be given the resources to create a Marine Division to police major ocean inlets and the St. Lawrence Seaway.

-- Training Delays. The committee recommends that the government ensure sufficient resources to train staff to use high-tech equipment at Canada's ports.

#### 1C. Canadian Forces

-- Budget Cuts. The committee recommends a minimum defence budget increase of \$4 billion CDN (\$3.2b USD)

-- Capital Acquisitions Falling Behind. The committee recommends that budget increases be purpose driven in respect to capital procurement, and adjusted for inflation.

-- Overheated Operational Tempo. The committee recommends that the Canadian Forces be withdrawn from overseas duty for 24 months.

-- Too Few Personnel - Too High Tempo. The committee recommends an increase in CF personnel to 75 000.

-- Overdue Defence Policy Review. The committee recommends that the government stop talking and complete its defence review.

-- Lack of Large-Scale Training Exercises. The committee recommends the return of regular battalion level exercises for the Canadian Forces.

-- The Slow Move to Wainwright. The committee recommends that the Canadian Maneuver Training Centre at Wainwright, Alberta be made operational as soon as possible.

#### 1D. Structure and Coordination of Government

-- Need for Muscle at the Top. The committee recommended the position of Deputy Prime Minister be made permanent and be attached to the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness portfolio.

-- Need for A Strong Team. The committee recommends a resources increase for the Deputy Prime Minister to allow the position to absorb increased responsibility.

-- Coordination at the Top. The committee recommends the creation of a cabinet committee to address public safety. (completed)

-- The Missing National Security Policy. The committee recommended that the government adopt a national security policy. (completed)

-- Need for Crisis Command Centres. The committee recommends the creation of an emergency operations centre. (completed)

-- Need for Canada-U.S. Coordination. The committee recommended the creation of a Canada-U.S. planning group. (completed)

- Slow Progress at Information-Sharing. The committee recommends the rapid implementation of the Maritime Information Management & Data Exchange Study.
- Lack of Surveillance Coordination. The committee recommends the establishment of surveillance and information coordination centres.
- Intelligence Community Understaffed. The committee recommends increased resources for hiring intelligence analysts.
- Weak Overseas Intelligence. The committee recommends that CSIS be mandated to upgrade overseas intelligence gathering.
- Information Fusion Failures. The committee recommends that information-sharing centres be taken off the drawing board and made operational as soon as possible.
- Lack of Oversight. The committee recommends that the government review whether or not organizations aside from CSIS or CSE require oversight.
- Coordination Lacking In Coastal Defence. The committee recommends the creation of maritime surveillance centres. (pending)
- Allocations of Proceeds of Crime. The committee recommends that confiscated goods be sold and the proceeds be directed back into border policing capabilities.
- Canada Too Inward Looking. The committee recommends that the government study how other countries are upgrading their port security.

#### **E. Ports**

- Vulnerable Ports. The committee recommends a public inquiry to investigate organized crime and how port police are recruited and trained.
- Organized Crime in Ports. The committee recommends a compulsory background check for all port staff.
- Port Perimeters. The committee recommends a review of all port perimeter security, including fencing and access points.
- Insufficient Police at Ports. The committee recommends that the RCMP be given primary duty for ports and airports, with a resource increase to reflect the responsibility.
- Inadequate Container Screening. The committee recommends that the Canadian Border Services Agency study requirements for x-ray and similar detectors and be given the resources to implement the recommendations.
- Inadequate Container Supervision. The committee recommends that the government implement container security. The Flynn Method.
- Fragile Ferries. The committee recommends that ferry traffic to Canada be required to provide passenger manifests.

#### **F. Airports**

- Screening Checked Baggage. The committee recommends that all airports be equipped to scan all baggage for weapons and explosives.
- Inadequate Background Checks. The committee recommends that all airport staff be given complete background checks.
- No Leadership on Airside Passes. The committee recommends the establishment of a national pass system for accessing high-security areas in airports.
- Unprepared Air Crews. The committee recommends that all aircrews be briefed and trained to help in terrorist situations.
- Armed Pilots? The committee recommends that pilots in Canada not be armed.
- Alerting Air Crews. The committee recommends that all flight crew be informed when an armed Aircraft Protection Officer is on the plane.
- Role of Aircraft Protection Officer. The committee recommends that Aircraft Protection Officers have their powers increased to intervene in all problem situations on airplanes, including air rage.

-- Vulnerable Cockpit Doors. The committee recommends that all aircraft be equipped with double doors.

-- Security Training for Maintenance Workers. The committee recommends that ground crews be given training to assist in identifying problem situations.

-- Responsibility for Airport Security Needs Clarifying - Who's in Charge? The committee recommends that a single government agency be placed in charge of airport security, and that the agency should report to the RCMP.

-- Known Shipper Makes Aircraft Insecure. The committee recommends that the 'Known Shipper' pass system be abolished and the same security requirements be made of all cargo companies.

-- Lack of Security at Fixed-Base Operations. The committee recommends that private aircraft be subject to the same security requirements as the major airlines.

-- Small Airports are Weak Links in the Aviation Security. The committee recommends that passengers arriving from small, under equipped airports be subject to passenger screening.

-- Access to Restricted Areas. The committee recommends that that Canadian Air Transport Security Authority be given the mandate to search people and vehicles entering restricted areas.

-- Airmail and Cargo Goes Unchecked. The committee recommends that mail and cargo traffic be scanned.

-- The Canadian Air Transport Authority Intelligence Gap. The committee recommends that the Canadian Air Transport Authority be given the resources to develop an intelligence branch.

-- Airport Policing is Inadequate. The committee recommends that all policing responsibility be placed in the hands of the RCMP (who can contract work to the Canadian Air Transport Authority).

-- Lack of Transparency for Security Improvements. The committee recommends that the Canadian Air Transport Authority should make a complete, annual report on its activities and expenditures.

-- Air Travellers' Security Charge. The committee recommends that the government completely account for the \$12 CDN Air Travellers Security Charge.

-- Unnecessary Secrecy. The committee recommends that Transport Canada be transparent and no longer use secrecy as a blanket means to avoid scrutiny.

-- Lack of Financial Transparency. The committee recommends that the Auditor General be given the authority to examine airport authorities.

#### **G. Emergency Preparedness**

-- Lack of Emergency Management. The committee recommends that the government examine the ability of all government departments and agencies to function in an emergency.

-- Emergency Ad Hockery. The committee recommends that Health Canada present a report on its ability to respond to a disease outbreak.

-- Inability to Deploy Police in an Emergency. The committee recommends that the federal government negotiate with the provinces for the rapid transfer of police across the country in response to an emergency.

-- No Role for Reserves. The committee recommends that the Canadian Forces improve its ability to act as a first responder by more efficiently preparing the reserves for such a role.

-- No Domestic Role for the DART. The committee recommends that the CF Disaster Assistant Response Team be given a domestic role.

-- Emergency Caches Mismanaged. The committee recommends that Health Canada make information on emergency storage caches available to first responders and local authorities.

-- Lack of Equipment for First Responders. The committee recommends that the federal government should provide resources to purchase chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response training and equipment.

-- Institutional "Lessons Learned" Memory Bank. The committee recommends that the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness act to keep its lessons learned files up to date, and that the information be completely shared with first responders across the country.

-- Lack of Centralized Health Protection. The committee recommends the establishment of a Health Protection and Promotion Agency to prepare for and manage events like the SARS crisis.

-- Poor Collaboration. The committee recommends that the government negotiate jurisdiction management agreements with Provinces and Municipalities.

-- Emergency Public Communications. The committee recommends that the government prepare a system for emergency communication with the public.

-- Poor Communications Equipment. The committee recommends that first responders across Canada be given uniform communications equipment.

-- First Responders Out of Loop. The committee recommends that local first responders be included in core planning.

-- Weak Central Knowledge Base on Critical Infrastructure. The committee recommends that the government cooperate with provinces and municipalities to create a list of vital infrastructure.

-- Lack of Leadership on Best Practices. The committee recommends that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness take on a role of leadership across jurisdictions and provincial and municipal borders.

-- Large Cities Should Be Helping Regions. The committee recommends that additional resources be given to urban centres that is tied to their willingness to support rural areas in the event of a crisis.

13. (U) The government has started to act on some of the report's recommendations and the introduction outlines some of the successes of Paul Martin's Liberal Government. These are: the creation of the office of the Deputy Prime Minister Responsible for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the release of the National Security Policy, the new maritime surveillance operations centres, and the acknowledgement that the Canadian Forces have been overstretched and that both resource increases and a period of rest are required.

14. (SBU) Note: Canadian Senators are patronage appointees who hold their positions until retirement. Calls for Senate reform are common. However, it is the responsibility of Senate Committees to monitor, investigate and report on issues of interest to their mandate. Senate committees strive to maintain their role as relevant investigators and reporters. End note.

15. (U) The online version of the report can be found at the following hyperlink,  
[http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/se\\_nate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep03nov04-e.htm](http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/se_nate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/rep03nov04-e.htm)  
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